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This paper sets up a canonical new Keynesian small open economy model with nominal 
price rigidities to explore the impact of habit persistence and exchange rate pass-through on 
the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules. It identifies three factors that can 
affect the welfare ranking: the degree of habit persistence, the degree of exchange rate 
pass-through, and labor supply elasticity. In contrast to the findings of De Paoli (2009a, 
2009b), the analysis reveals a reversal in the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy 
rules for unitary intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution, depending on the 
asset market structures of small open economies with external habit. The paper also finds 
that exchange rate pegging outperforms domestic producer price index inflation targeting at 
high degrees of intratemporal elasticity of substitution and external habit, regardless of asset 
market structures. Finally, the paper finds that exchange rate pegging outperforms domestic 
or consumer price index inflation targeting if the exchange rate is misaligned. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of the policy debate in international finance lies the question of whether 
monetary authorities should react to both  fluctuations in international relative prices and 
domestic output and inflation. Several papers have explored how monetary policy should 
react to disturbances in open economies with complete asset markets. These papers have 
emphasized  that monetary policy is influenced by the presence of a terms of trade 
externality.  
Evidence from the literature suggests that strict domestic inflation targeting would be the 
optimal monetary policy in producer currency pricing circumstances, except where the trade 
elasticity  of substitution (i.e., the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign 
goods) is implausibly high. In particular, Gali and Monacelli (2005) showed that the optimal 
monetary policy in a small open economy is isomorphic to the one in the closed economy, 
when both the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution  one in the producer 
currency pricing model.
1
The recent financial turmoil has generated greater  interest in feasible  monetary policy 
prescriptions not only for economies with sophisticated financial structures, but also for   
economies with fragile financial structures. Although many emerging economies have shifted 
from a fixed exchange rate to a floating exchange rate regime, the extent to which monetary 
policy should adjust to account for the impact of the exchange rate on the domestic economy 
remains highly controversial. Some policymakers in emerging economies still believe in a 
trade-off between inflation and exchange rate stability,  thus  bringing  into question the 
desirable form of monetary policy. They believe that monetary policy which preserves the 
competitiveness of domestic products in the exchange market is necessary to improve the 
welfare of economies with fragile financial structures. 
  
More recently, Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) and De Paoli (2009b) have argued that 
the configuration of the domestic asset market significantly affects the performance of 
monetary policy rules, by changing the degree of risk-sharing. In a complete asset market, 
optimal risk-sharing severs the link between domestic consumption and domestic output, 
allowing domestic agents to reduce their labor supply without causing a corresponding fall in 
their consumption levels. In an incomplete asset market, on the other hand, where domestic 
consumption and domestic output are closely related, domestic households cannot decrease 
their disutility of labor supply without decreasing their utility from consumption. Therefore, the 
monetary policy prescription for open economies with complete markets may not hold for 
open economies with incomplete asset markets.  
According to De Paoli (2009b), the domestic price index inflation targeting (hereafter DPI) 
rule outperforms the exchange rate pegging (hereafter PEG) rule and the consumer price 
index inflation targeting (hereafter  CPI) rule in financial autarkies as well as incomplete 
markets, except when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is low.
2
More  recent papers have shown that incorporating  real rigidities—such as internal or 
external habit formation—improves the explanatory power of dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (hereafter DSGE) models over business cycles. For example, Adolfson et al. 
(2007) and Christiano, Trabant, and Walentin (2007) have reported that incorporating habit 
 
Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) have also argued that near divine coincidence holds for 
economies characterized by a high trade elasticity of substitution, i.e., where domestic and 
foreign goods are close substitutes.  This  is true  even in incomplete markets where 
inefficiencies are present due to exchange rate misalignments. In particular, they showed 
that an inward-looking monetary policy is optimal for unitary intratemporal and intertemporal 
elasticities of substitution, if there are only efficient technology shocks. 
                                                 
1 See De Paoli (2009) and Faia and Monacelli (2008) for a small open economy model.   
2 The DPI rule outperforms the PEG rule and the CPI rule in an incomplete market as well as in a financial 
autarky when the domestic and foreign goods are not close substitutes---i.e. when the intratemporal elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and foreign goods is higher than 0.7. ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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formation improves the empirical performance of small-scale, open macroeconomic models 
by introducing persistence into structural equations  (such as the  Euler equation and the 
Phillips curve in the open economy new Keynesian model). Sticky price models with habit 
persistence in consumption generate the expected hump-shaped response of consumption 
and output to a monetary shock; the monetary policy implications of such models therefore 
warrant a closer look. 
 This paper sets up a small open economy with internal and external habit persistence and 
alternative asset market structures, to explore  the welfare implications of alternative 
monetary policy rules. Households with external habit unconsciously overheat the economy 
during  expansionary phases,  and  disproportionately  cool down the economy during 
contractionary phases. Households with external habit tend to work harder than necessary to 
keep up with the Joneses, causing the economy to produce more than the efficient level of 
output. In a small open economy, this leads to a deterioration in its terms of trade, while the 
terms of trade for  the rest of the world remains unchanged. In this way, external habit 
generates the welfare-relevant real exchange rate gap and output gap. 
The deterioration in the terms of trade hurts the purchasing power of domestic households 
and intensifies the negative impact of externality on consumption in a small open economy. 
Since  both  consumption  and  leisure critically depend on the asset market structure that 
provides options for  risk-sharing, the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy 
prescriptions can differ depending on the prevailing asset market structure. 
The objective of the paper is to explore the implications of alternative monetary policy rules 
under different asset market structures, when households have external or internal habit 
formation in consumption. Specifically, does habit formation matter for the welfare ranking of 
alternative monetary policy rules in small open economies with alternative asset market 
structures?  This paper will address this issue by utilizing an explicit utility-based welfare 
analysis. 
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows: 
First, asset market structure is relevant for the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy 
rules in a small open economy with habit persistence. In particular, inward-looking monetary 
policy is not invariant in a small open economy with external habit under alternative asset 
market structures, even if both the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution 
equal one. Contrary to De Paoli (2009a, 2009b), and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010), the 
DPI rule is better than the CPI rule in a complete market, but the CPI rule can be better than 
the DPI rule in  a  financial autarky with  external habit, even if both intertemporal and 
intratemporal elasticities of substitution equal one.  
Second, the existence of external habit can reverse the welfare ranking of simple monetary 
policy rules in a complete market as well as in a financial autarky, for moderate values of 
intratemporal elasticity of substitution: with external habit, the PEG rule regime outperforms 
the DPI rule regime for high values of intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home 
and foreign goods when households are catching up with the Joneses, irrespective of asset 
market structure. For example, the DPI rule can be inferior to the CPI rule in a small open 
economy sticky price model with high degree of external habit and financial autarky, while 
the DPI rule is best among the considered simple rules in a complete asset market. This 
finding starkly contrasts to the findings of De Paoli (2009b).  
Third, the existence of habit matters for the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy 
rules, irrespective of internal and external habit. For example, the PEG rule  is the best 
among the considered simple rules if there exits inefficiency in the exchange rate due to 
incomplete exchange rate pass-through, irrespective of internal and external habit. Finally, 
we show that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply as well as the intratemporal elasticity 
between home goods and imported goods plays a pivotal role in determining the welfare 
ranking of simple monetary rules in a small open economy with nominal rigidities. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a canonical small 
open economy model with habit persistence and nominal price rigidities. Section 3 discusses ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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equilibrium conditions and the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
2.  THE MODEL 
This section sets up a variant of the new Keynesian model with habit formation applied to a 
small, open-economy. The world is composed of two countries, home (H) and foreign (F) 
with population size n  and  1-n,  respectively. In this paper, the small open economy is 
characterized as a limiting-case approach, as in Faia and Monacelli (2008) and Gali and 
Monacelli (2005). It is assumed that the relative size of the domestic economy is negligible 
relative to the rest of the world, i.e.   
2.1  Households 
Abel (1990, 1999) and Smets and Wouters (2007) specified a simple recursive preference, 
in which a representative household derives utility from the level of consumption relative to a 
time-varying subsistence or habit level. In particular, we assume that the utility function of 
the representative household takes the form
3
                                           
:  
 
                                                                                                        
where  β  is the household's discount factor; 0 E  denotes the conditional expectations 
operator on the information available in period 0;  t t
d
t bH C C − = .  , t C   t N , and  t H  represent 
the household's consumption for composite goods, work hours, and the time-varying habit 
level of consumption at time t, respectively; and  1 0 ≤ ≤ b  measures the degree of external 
habit persistence. To make the discussion more concrete, a specific domestic constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) consumption index is assumed as follows:  
                                               
where  θ α ) 1 ( n − ≡  is the share of domestic consumption allocated to imported goods, and 
η  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Similarly, a foreign 
CES consumption index is assumed as follows: 
                                               
where 
* * θ α n ≡ .4
                                                                     
  To consider home bias in consumption, it is assumed that 
 
Here,  Ht C  and  Ft C  are indices of consumption of domestic and foreign goods, respectively; 
these are given by the following CES aggregators of the consumed amounts of each type of 
good:  
         
                                                 
3 When the financial market is complete, each household's behavior can be rewritten in the same way as in 
Woodford (2003).  
4 Foreign values of the corresponding domestic variables are denoted by an asterisk (*). ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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where ε  measures the elasticity of substitution among goods within each category. In this 
context, the consumer price index is given by 
                                          
where  Ht P  and  Ft P  respectively denote the price of domestic goods and imported foreign 
goods in domestic currency unit in period t, given by  
           
The law of one  price is assumed to hold, i.e.,  ) ( ) (
* j P S j P Ht t Ht = , and  ) ( ) (
* j P S j P Ft t Ft = , 
where  t S  is the nominal exchange rate in period t.  t H  summarizes the influence of past 
consumption levels on today's utility. The utility of a representative household depends on a 
utility of the difference between consumption and habit. Two types of habit persistence are 
considered in this paper. In the case of external habit persistence, the stochastic sequence 
of habits { }
∞
=0 t t H  is regarded as exogenous by the household and tied to the stochastic 
sequence of aggregate consumption, { }
∞
=0 t t C . For simplicity,  t H  is specified as an external 
habit dependent only on aggregate consumption, as in Abel (1990, 1999) and Smets and 
Wouters (2007). That is, 
                                                          
where   is aggregate past consumption. In this specification of habit formation, habit 
depends on one lag of consumption. In the case of internal habit persistence, it is assumed 
that  
                                                                   . 1 − = t t C H  
 
The optimal allocation of any given domestic expenditure within each category of goods is 
given by 
                                                    
Similarly, the optimal allocation of any given foreign expenditure within each category of 
goods is given by 
                                                 
where  ,
*
t P   ,
*
Ft P  and 
*
Ht P  denote the foreign consumer price index and the price of foreign 
goods and domestic goods in foreign currency unit in period t, respectively. ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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2.2  Asset Markets 
Having looked at habit persistence in households, we now consider three alternative asset 
markets: the complete market, the incomplete market, and financial autarky.  
2.2.1  Complete Markets 
As in Gali and Monacelli (2005), there exists a complete market for state-contingent claims 
in domestic currency units that are traded internationally. Hence, households can optimally 
share risk with the rest of the world because they have access to a full set of assets, 
contingent on all possible states of nature. This asset market structure implies 
                                                 . 
Here,   is the real exchange rate, and   
           
Here, κ  is a parameter capturing the initial cross-country distribution of wealth.  ) (
*
t C C U  is 
similarly defined. Following Gali and Monacelli (2005), we assume symmetric initial 
conditions without loss of generality, in which we have  . 1 = κ  
2.2.2  Incomplete Markets 
In an incomplete market, it is assumed that domestic households can trade only one-period 
nominal riskless bonds,  denominated in both  home and foreign currencies;    meanwhile, 
foreign households can trade only one-period nominal riskless bonds denominated in foreign 
currency. It is also assumed that the international trade of foreign currency-denominated 
bonds is subject to intermediation costs, as in Benigno (2008) .
5
                  
 Accordingly, the domestic 
household's budget constraint can be written as 
 
Here  Ht B  and  Ft B  denote domestic and foreign currency denominated nominal bonds, 
respectively;  t R  and 
*
t R  are the corresponding interest rates; and  t W ,  t TR , and  t τ  denote 
nominal wages, government transfers given to the domestic household, and the tax rate on 
labor income in period t. The function   represents the cost of, or the risk premium 
on, international borrowings. The risk premium is increasing with the country's foreign debt, 
i.e.   and is equal to zero when the economy is in the steady state, i.e., 
in the steady state. 
Because foreign households are assumed to trade only in foreign currency bonds, their 
budget constraint can be written as  
                            
where  t Γ  is the intermediation profits from loans to the small country. 
 First order conditions for the household can be summarized as follows: 
                                                 
5 This intermediation cost assumption is made for technical reasons. See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
(2003) for alternative assumptions to overcome the stationary problem in a small open economy 
model.  ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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where foreign values of the corresponding domestic variables are denoted by an asterisk (*). 
Similarly, the foreign household's intertemporal decision of bond holdings is given by 
                      
(15) and (16) imply that the equilibrium real exchange rate   is determined by  
                              
where   The log-linearization of (17) shows that the expected depreciation of 
the real exchange rate is determined by the net foreign asset as well as by the difference of 
the expected future, current, and past domestic and foreign consumption: 






Ft ≡  and  C  is the steady-state consumption, and  B η  is the sensitivity of 
intermediation cost or risk premium to the net foreign asset. 
2.2.3  Financial Autarky 
In a financial autarky, households do not have access to international borrowing or lending. 
Hence, there is no risk-sharing across borders. Assuming that the initial distribution of wealth 
across domestic households is symmetrical, the domestic and foreign households’ budget 
constraints can be written as 
                                       
Meanwhile, the value of domestic production equals the value of consumption, and the value 
of exports equals the value of imports: 
                                                
where t G is domestic government spending in period t. 
2.3  Domestic Firms 
Differentiated goods and monopolistic competition are introduced along the lines of Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977). Suppose there is a continuum of firms producing differentiated goods, and 
each firm indexed by  , 1 0 ≤ ≤ i  produces its product with constant returns to scale  and a ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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concave production technology. Each domestic firm i takes  Ht P  and the aggregate demand 
as given, and chooses its own product price  ) (i PHt . In this economy, the distortion occurs 
due to the existence of monopolistic competition in the goods market. On average, the firm 
sets its price above marginal cost. In equilibrium, this makes the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and labor different from their corresponding marginal rate of 
transformation. Because we do not assign any explicit value to the holding of money 
balances, we can eliminate the distortion associated with the Friedman rule. 
Each monopolistic firm i produces a homogenous good according to 
                                                       
where  t A  is the home country resident's technology process at period t.  ) (i Yt  and  ) (i Nt  are 
the output and total labor input of the ith firm, respectively. We assume that the productivity 
shock follows an AR(1)  process as  At t A A t A A A ξ ρ ρ + + − = −1 log log ) 1 ( log , where 
0 ) ( = At E ξ  and  At ξ  is i.i.d. over time. Since the input markets are perfectly competitive, the 
firm  s j'  demand for labor is determined by its cost minimization as follows: 











mc ≡  are the domestic real wage and domestic firm's markup in 
period t, respectively. Since the household's labor supply is given by 
                                                     
plugging (22) into (23) implies a labor market equilibrium condition 
                                               





 can be expressed in terms of the terms of trade   as 
follows 
                                           
            The real exchange rate is also linked to the terms of trade through the following 
expression: 
                                     
Next, a discrete time version of the Calvo (1983)-style staggered price setting rule is 
introduced to consider the nominal price rigidities. Each firm resets its optimal price   
with probability  ) 1 ( α −  in any given period, independent of the time elapsed since the last 
adjustment . The other fraction of firms, α , set their current prices at their previous price 
levels. Firm  ' j s profit maximization problem can be written as follows. 
       ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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subject to the sequence of demand constraints  
                                            
where   with a probability 
k α  and 
. .... 2 , 1 , 0 ∞ = k  
The problem can be rewritten as 
 
Since   is the same for the reoptimizing firms, i.e.   the optimal price 
setting equation can be written as 









+ ≡  and   represent the domestic markup and the average 
markup in goods market, respectively. The optimal price setting equation can be expressed 
as a recursive form as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Yun (2005): 
                                                     
where   
          
and   
             
Here,   is the relative price of any domestic good whose price was adjusted in 











P 1 + ≡ π  represent the domestic price index inflation rate 
and the consumer price index inflation rate at time t+1,respectively. Equation (29) is a short-
run nonlinear aggregate supply relation between inflation and output, given expectations ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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regarding future inflation, output, and disturbances. The domestic price aggregator implies 
that the relative price   satisfies the relationship: 
                                           
2.4  Importing Firms 
In this section, we consider two cases of the price-setting mechanism for goods imported 
from the rest of the world. The first is the case of a perfect exchange rate pass-through, 
wherein foreign companies do not have any role in setting prices, as in Gali and Monacelli 
(2005) and De Paoli (2009a, 2009b). The second is the case of an imperfect exchange rate 
pass-through, wherein foreign companies have market power and affect the consumer price. 
2.4.1  Perfect Pass-Through 
First, assume that the Law of One Price holds, such that the price of foreign good j  in 
domestic currency,  ) ( j PFt , equals its price denominated in foreign currency,  ) (
* j PFt , 
multiplied by the nominal exchange rate,  t S : 
                      
In the rest of the world, a representative household faces a problem identical to the one 
outlined above. The only difference is that a negligible weight is assigned to consumption 
goods produced in the small economy  ) 1 (
* = θ . Therefore, 
* *
Ft t P P = , and 
* *
Ft t C C = , for all t.  
This is the case of perfect pass-through (PPT), in which a change in the exchange rate is 
perfectly reflected in the domestic price of imported goods. In PPT, the ratio between the 
price of foreign imports and the nominal exchange rate is one to one. 
2.4.2  Imperfect Pass-Through 
To take into account possible  delays  between movements in the exchange rate and 
adjustments  in  imported goods prices, suppose that domestic importers set prices in 
advance by maximizing the present value of profits as in the monopolistically competitive 
domestic firms. That is, suppose that domestic local retailers import differentiated goods for 
which the law of one price holds at the dock, but they face a Calvo-type price optimization 
problem in setting the domestic currency price of the goods as in Monacelli (2005). A fraction 
* 1 α −  of the local retailer, who import good j  at a cost  ) (
* j P S Ft t , reoptimize their 
price ) ( j PFt  in domestic currency unit to maximize their current market value of profit;  the 
other fraction of firms, 
* α set their current prices at their previous price levels. Since the 
importer j  imports the foreign goods at a cost  ) (
*
, j P S k t Ft k t + + , the domestic importer ' j s profit 
maximization problem can be written as follows: 
         
subject to the sequence of demand constraints 




k * α  is the probability that the reoptimized price   at time t still holds k  periods 
ahead. 
The profit maximization problem can be rewritten as 
 
The optimal price setting equation can be written as 
 
where  is the ratio of world price of imports j  to the domestic price. This 
term measures the deviation from the law of one price. The optimal price setting equation 
can be expressed as a recursive form as before: 
                                                   
where 
          
and 
                








+ ≡ π  represents the importables price index inflation rate at time t+1. The 
importable goods price aggregator implies that the relative price   satisfies the 
relationship: 
                                          ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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2.5  Equilibrium 
Aggregating individual output across firms reveals a wedge between the aggregate output 
t Y  and aggregate labor hours t N  




















 is the relative price dispersion in period t. The relative price 
distortion Ht ∆  that results from the firms' staggered price setting practice in the Calvo-type 
model can be rewritten as a recursive form: 
                                  
with  1 ,− ∆H  given. Note that the domestic government budget constraint is given by  
                                        
Assuming a symmetric degree of home bias across countries, and the negligible relative size 
of home country as in Faia and Monacelli (2008), goods market clearing in both home and 
foreign countries requires that 
                          
For analytical simplicity, assume that the government spending and tax rate are always 
equal to zero, i.e. , 0 = = = t t t TR G τ . The competitive equilibrium conditions consist of the 
efficiency conditions and the budget constraint of households and firms, and the market 
clearing conditions of each goods market, labor market, money, and bond market. 
Accordingly, the symmetric equilibrium is an allocation of { } , , , , , , 0
* * * ∞
= t t t t t t t Y Y N N C C  a 
sequence of prices and costate variables for the home and foreign country 
{ } , , , , , , , , , , , , 0
* * * * * * ∞
= ∆ ∆ t Ft Ht t t Ft Ft t t Ft Ht Ft Ht mc mc B B P P P P P P  and a sequence of the real exchange 
rate   such that (i) the households’ decision rules solve their optimization problem 
given the states and prices; (ii) the demand for labor solves each firm's cost minimization 
problem and price setting rules  solve its present value maximization problem given the 
states and the prices; and (3) each goods market, labor market, and bond market are 
cleared at the corresponding prices, given the initial conditions for the state variables 




1 1 , 1 − − − − ∆ ∆ F H C C  and the exogenous productivity shock processes { }
∞
=0
* , t t t A A   as well 
as the monetary and fiscal policies { }
∞
=0
* * , , , t t t t t R R τ τ . ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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3.  WELFARE UNDER ALTERNATIVE ASSET MARKET 
STRUCTURES 
In this section, we explore the effect of external habit on welfare under alternative monetary 
regimes, using a small open economy as benckmark. Specifically, we explore the welfare 
rankings of alternative monetary policy rules by employing tsecond-order  approximation 
methods along the line of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006). 
3.1  Parameter Values 
Table 1 summarizes all the parameter values used in this paper, as derived from De Paoli 
(2009), Faia and Monacelli (2008), and Gali and Monacelli (2005). First, we set both the 
intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution,
1 − σ  and  η to 1,  and the 
intratemporal elasticity of labor supply 
1 − ν  to 0.5 in the benchmark model. Because these 
parameter values play a key role in the welfare ranking of simple monetary policy rules, we 
also consider other alternative values, as reflected in Table 1. In particular, the intratemporal 
elasticity between home and foreign goods—which plays a key role in the dynamic 
properties of the selected macroeconomic variables in the model—is set to values in [1,6]. 
We set the subjective discount factor to 
) 4 / 1 ( 04 . 1
− , which is consistent with an annual real 
interest rate of 4 percent,  as in Prescott (1986). Next, we set the elasticity of substitution 
among varieties ε  to 6, implying the average size of markup to be 1.2,  as in Gali and 
Monacelli (2005). The values of the nominal rigidity parameter, iα  and 
* α ,  are chosen to 
reflect the fact that on average, firms reoptimize their prices annually in the Calvo-type sticky 
price model.   
 
Table 1: Parameter Values 
Parameter  Values  Description and definitions 
B  0, 0.5,  0.7  Degree of habit in consumption 
Ε  6  Elasticity of demand for a good with respect to its own price 
Σ  1  Relative risk aversion parameter 
Η  1, 2, 4, 6  Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods 
Ν  0,5, 1, 3  Inverse of elasticity of labor supply 
R  0.016  Steady state real interest rate 
Sources: De Paoli (2009), Faia and Monacelli (2008), and Gali and Monacelli (2005). 
Finally, the exogenous driving process, i.e. the (log) productivity,  ) (t a and , ) (
* t y is assumed 
to follow an AR(1) as in De Paoli (2009), Faia and Monacelli (2008), and Gali and Monacelli 
(2005).  
                               
3.2  Real Exchange Rate and Welfare 
As described in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), internal 
monopolistic distortion and external terms of trade distortion influence welfare in a small 
open economy where domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes. In a small open 
economy with external habit, externality in consumption habit also  influences  welfare,  in 
addition to the terms of trade externality. One can address the full implications of the effect 
of external distortions on welfare using a second-order Taylor expansion to the utility 
function of the representative household.  ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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More importantly, the performance of monetary policy rules depends on the presence of 
external habit and asset market structure. We will discuss how the presence of external habit 
affects monetary policy prescription in a complete market and a financial autarky, using the 
first-order terms of the approximated logarithmic utility. 
Equilibrium conditions in a complete market imply that the utility function of the household 
with external habit can be linearly approximated as 
        
where    
 and  is aggregate consumption at t-1.   
refer to terms of order higher than one, and   . . . p i t  refers to terms independent of policy, 
such as foreign consumption and exogenous shocks. Note that  has a negative value 
and decreases as either the degree of external habit or the degree of intratemporal elasticity 
of substitution between home and foreign goods increases ( Figures 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B). 
On average, therefore, an appreciated real exchange rate (i.e. the low value of  ] [ k t t q E +  is 
more likely to be welfare improving under complete markets  as the degree of external habit 
and the intratemporal trade elasticity of substitution increases. 
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Meanwhile, the equilibrium conditions in a financial autarky imply that the utility function of 
the household can be approximated as 
        
where   In (50), the sign of the term 
 is ambiguous.   depends not only on the elasticity of substitution between home and 
foreign goods η , but also on the degree of external habit b  and the degree of openness θ . 
As either the degree of external habit or the degree of intratemporal elasticity of substitution 
between home and foreign goods increases,   decreases (Figures 2C and 2D).   takes 
a positive value when the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is high and the degree of 
external habit is low (Figure 1C). That is, on average, an appreciated real exchange rate is 
welfare improving under financial autarky  with a higher degree of external habit, while the 
reverse is true in a financial autarky with a lower degree of external habit. 
 In the case of internal habit, the first-order approximation of the utility function can be written 
as 
                           
where   and 
.
1













bC C N C U    If   as in Gali and Monacelli 
(2005) and De Paoli (2009b), then   whose value is positive (negative) if 
). 1 ( 1 > < θ θ Hence, the presence of internal habit does not monetary policy prescription in a 




3.3  Price Stability vs. Exchange Rate Stability in the Case of 
Perfect Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
 
In this section, we discuss the welfare implications of alternative monetary policy rules in the 
case of perfect exchange rate pass-through, by exploiting the recursive nature of the life-
time utility function (1) to compute the welfare cost, as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).
6
3.3.1  Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary policy Rules in Financial Autarkies 
 
In the case of a financial autarky, consumption is fully linked to domestic output. Moreover, 
households work more than necessary in the presence of external habit, producing output 
that exceeds the efficient level. Hence, monetary policy that lowers production to a more 
efficient level improves welfare by decreasing the disutility of (excessive) labor hours. An 
additional improvement in welfare is possible if the policy leads to a real exchange rate 
appreciation, leading  households with higher purchasing power to  divert some of their 
consumption from domestic goods to foreign goods.  
Since lowering the volatility of the real exchange rate is associated with a real exchange rate 
appreciation, monetary policy aimed at  stabilizing either the general price index or the 
                                                 
6 Suppose that  c λ  is the welfare cost of adopting monetary policy regime (fore example PEG)   instead of 
monetary policy regime   (for example PPI), conditional on a particular state in period zero  ). ( 0 s If  c λ  is the 
fraction of policy regime  ’s consumption process that the domestic household would be willing to give up in 
order to be equally well off under regimes   and  , then, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) show that the 
conditional welfare cost measure is given by 
   . 
 ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
 
16 
exchange rate will tend to cause a bigger appreciation in the real exchange rate, much than 
more than stabilizing the domestic price index would (As shown in equation (50), either the 
CPI rule or the PEG rule is more likely to outperform the DPI rule under a financial autarky, if 
there exists a substantial degree of external habit. 
 
Table 2: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Perfect Pass-Through with External 
Habit (σ=1, η=1, b=0.8) 
Asset Market  Autarky  Incomplete  Complete 
Ν=1/2       
CPI  -1.2715×10⁻⁴  0.0794  0.0042 
PEG  0.0057  0.1069  0.0105 
Ν=1       
CPI  2.9245×10⁻⁴  0.0587  0.0050 
PEG  0.0075  0.0865  0.0131 
Ν=3       
CPI  0.0017  0.0318  0.0069 
PEG  0.0133  0.0639  0.0215 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. 
The presence of external habit plays an important role in ranking alternative monetary policy 
rules even if the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is low, i.e. even if home and foreign 
goods are complementary. Consider the benchmark case, where both the intertemporal and 
intratemporal elasticities are equal to one, i.e.  . 1 = =η σ  In the absence of external habit, 
there is no expenditure switching effect under the benchmark case, because the income and 
substitution effects due to international relative price movements cancel each other out. In 
contrast, international relative price movements will have  an expenditure switching effect 
even if  , 1 = =η σ  in the presence of external habit.  
Asset market structure is likewise relevant for the dynamics of the small open economy as 
well as for the welfare characterization for  . 1 = =η σ  As Table 2 shows, the CPI rule 
outperforms the DPI rule for  1 = µ  and  8 . 0 = b , i.e., if households have a high degree of 
external habit. The following tables report differences in welfare measured as a % of the 
permanent shift in steady-state consumption, between a policy that targets domestic inflation 
(PPI rule) and one that pegs the exchange rate (PEG rule). They also show the difference 
between the PPI rule and the CPI rule (which targets consumer price index inflation). 
Tables  3–5  show that the CPI rule is better than the DPI rule in a small economy  with 
financial autarky for the degree of external habit equal to 0.7, when intratemporal elasticity of 
substitution is higher than 2. The PEG rule is better than the DPI rule for higher values of 
Frisch labor supply elasticity and intratemporal elasticity of substitution. This implies that the 
CPI and PEG rules are more successful in reducing the disutility of excess labor hours than 
the DPI rule, as long as there is room for households to substitute their labor hours and 
consumption, i.e., 
1 − ν  and η  are high. This contrasts to the findings of De Paoli (2009b) 
who showed that the DPI rule is best in both a financial autarky and a complete market.  
Tables 3 to 5 also show that in addition to the degree of habit persistence, both the Frisch 
labor supply elasticity of substitution and the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between 
domestic goods and foreign goods affect the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy 




Table 3: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Financial Autarky with Perfect Pass-
Through (η=2) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  0.0013  0.0014  0.0015 
0.5  5.7201×10⁻⁴  6.9368×10⁻⁴  9.9667×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -1.1975×10⁻⁴  -2.9849×10⁻⁴  2.8972×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0046  0.0052  0.0066 
0.5  0.0031  0.0037  0.0052 
0.7  0.0013  0.0019  0.0034 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  0.0013  0.0014  0.0015 
0.5  3.5976×10⁻⁴  4.6371×10⁻⁴  7.5742×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  1.1335×10⁻⁴  1.7285×10⁻⁴  3.4147×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0046  0.0052  0.0066 
0.5  0.0014  0.0019  0.0035 
0.7  4.7026×10⁻⁴  6.9368×10⁻⁴  0.0016 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. 
Table 4: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Financial Autarky with Perfect Pass-
Through (η=4) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  4.1221×10⁻⁴  4.1168×10⁻⁴  4.0640×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  7.3485×10⁻⁴  1.0403×10⁻⁴  1.8398×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -2.0458×10⁻⁴  -1.9669×10⁻⁴  -1.3078×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0016  0.0017  0.0020 
0.5  7.3636×10⁻⁴  8.9465×10⁻⁴  0.0013 
0.7  -7.1752×10⁻⁴  3.4513×10⁻⁴  4.1341×10⁻⁴ 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  4.1221×10⁻⁴  4.1168×10⁻⁴  4.0640×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  1.1179×10⁻⁴  1.4197×10⁻⁴  2.1738×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  3.4957×10⁻⁴  4.9709×10⁻⁵  1.0200×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0016  0.0017  0.0020 
0.5  4.1429×10⁻⁴  5.4828×10⁻⁴  9.4497×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  1.2346×10⁻⁴  1.8192×10⁻⁴  4.0554×10⁻⁴ 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  




Table 5: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Financial Autarky with Perfect Pass-
Through (η=6) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  2.0403×10⁻⁴  1.9825×10⁻⁴  1.8577×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  1.3097×10⁻⁶  1.5096×10⁻⁵  1.4241×10⁻⁵ 
0.7  -1.6327×10⁻⁴  -1.6522×10⁻⁴  -1.4091×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  8.6708×10⁻⁴  9.0053×10⁻⁴  9.6081×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  2.7921×10⁻⁴  3.5234×10⁻⁴  5.3954×10⁻⁵ 
0.7  -2.0870×10⁻⁴  -1.7341×10⁻⁴  -1.2521×10⁻⁵ 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  2.0403×10⁻⁴  1.9825×10⁻⁴  1.8577×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  6.2079×10⁻⁵  7.7946×10⁻⁵  1.1403×10⁻⁵ 
0.7  1.9508×10⁻⁵  2.7952×10⁻⁵  5.6333×10⁻⁵ 
PEG       
0  8.6708×10⁻⁴  9.0053×10⁻⁴  9.6081×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  2.1536×10⁻⁴  2.8148×10⁻⁵  4.6567×10⁻⁵ 
0.7  6.4044×10⁻⁵  9.3809×10⁻⁵  2.0409×10⁻⁵ 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. 
We now consider the case of internal habit, where a household’s current consumption is a 
determinant of future utility. With internal habit, there is no inefficiency or externality in 
production or labor hours; the findings of De Paoli (2009b) therefore hold in this case, i.e., 
the DPI rule is better than the PEG at high values of intratemporal elasticity of substitution 
(See Tables 3–5). 
3.3.2  Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules in Complete Markets 
Domestic consumption is not closely linked to domestic production in a complete market. 
First, consider the case of external habit. In a complete market, the coefficient of the 
expected real exchange rate in the welfare equation (39)  always negative, i.e.   
Therefore, the lower value of  )] ( [ 0 t q E  improves welfare for any η >1. The substitution effect 
dominates the wealth effect for a higher intratemporal elasticity of substitution,  thereby 
making the PEG rule better than the DPI rule. If the Frisch labor supply elasticity is high (i.e., 
if households are more willing to intratemporally substitute their labor supply when wage 
changes due to an external shock), then the policy of maintaining a stable exchange rate is 
welfare improving. The effect of a real exchange rate appreciation on welfare increases if 
there is more room for households to decrease their labor supply and households have a 
higher degree of external habit in consumption, as shown in Tables 6–8. 
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Table 6: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Complete Market with Perfect Pass-
Through (η=2) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  7.4100×10⁻⁴  9.8887×10⁻⁴  0.0013 
0.5  -6.9462×10⁻⁴  1.5713×10⁻⁴  9.8329×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -0.0025  -0.0012  3.9062×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0029  0.0039  0.0057 
0.5  -0.0015  7.3848×10⁻⁴  0.0044 
0.7  -0.0073  -0.0035  0.0022 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  7.4100×10⁻⁴  9.8887×10⁻⁴  0.0013 
0.5  6.4518×10⁻⁴  9.5654×10⁻⁴  0.0015 
0.7  5.8338×10⁻⁴  9.4104×10⁻⁴  0.0016 
PEG       
0  0.0029  0.0039  0.0057 
0.5  0.0028  0.0039  0.0061 
0.7  0.0028  0.0039  0.0065 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. 
Table 7: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Complete Market with Perfect Pass-
Through (η=4) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  -0.0011  -3.7181×10⁻⁴  1.2084×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0034  -0.0016  -2.7925×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -0.0063  -0.0031  -8.1613×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  -0.0033  -0.0011  6.4186×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0107  -0.0052  -9.1388×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -0.0204  -0.0108  -0.0031 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  -0.0011  -3.7181×10⁻⁴  1.2084×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0012  -4.2349×10⁻⁴  1.1906×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -0.00112  -4.6324×10⁻⁴  1.1576×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  -0.0033  -0.0011  6.4186×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0035  -0.0012  6.5809×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -0.0037  -0.0013  6.6345×10⁻⁴ 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  




Table 8: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Complete Market with Perfect Pass-
Through (η=6) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  Ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  -0.0015  -5.6342×10⁻⁴  -4.8212×10⁻⁵ 
0.5  -0.0038  -0.0016  -3.2427×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -0.0067  -0.0029  -6.8352×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  -0.0050  -0.0020  -1.4884×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0124  -0.0058  -0.0013 
0.7  -0.0224  -0.0104  -0.0028 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  -0.0015  -5.6342×10⁻⁴  -4.8212×10⁻⁵ 
0.5  -0.0016  -6.0584×10⁻⁴  -5.7227×10⁻⁵ 
0.7  -00016  -6.3703×10⁻⁴  -6.3539×10⁻⁵ 
PEG       
0  -0.0050  -0.0020  -1.4884×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0051  -0.0021  -1.7097×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -0.0053  -0.0022  -1.9145×10⁻⁴ 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. 
If households have a substantial degree of external habit, a  higher Frisch labor supply 
elasticity could overturn the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules, even if the 
intratemporal elasticity of substitution is low. For example, the welfare gain from the PEG 
rule relative to the DPI rule is approximately 0.007% of the steady state consumption for 
, 5 . 0 = ν   , 7 . 0 = b  and  , 2 = η  while there occurs a welfare loss from the PEG rule relative to 
the DPI rule for  , 5 . 0 = ν   , 0 = b  and  . 2 = η  That is, as long as domestic and foreign 
consumption goods are not close complements,  any  monetary policy that diverts some 
domestic production toward the foreign country can be welfare improving in the economy 
with external habit . Maintaining the nominal exchange rate reduces the volatility of the real 
exchange rate by  causing  the real exchange rate to appreciate, thereby reducing the 
disutility of domestic production and increasing the consumption of foreign goods. 
 However, the Frisch labor supply elasticity plays a relatively minor role in the welfare 
ranking of alternative monetary policy rules in the internal habit case. The effect of the real 
exchange rate appreciation on welfare depends on the degree of intratemporal elasticity of 
substitution more than the Frisch labor supply elasticity when households fully take into 
account their current consumption decision on future utility.  
3.3.3  Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary policy Rules in Incomplete Markets 
We now consider the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules in incomplete 
markets. In an incomplete market, the wealth effects are more tightly linked to domestic 
production than in a complete market.  
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Table 9: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Incomplete Market with Perfect Pass-
Through (η=2) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  0.0016  0.0021  0.0025 
0.5  0.0011  0.0023  0.0034 
0.7  2.9072×10⁻⁴  0.0024  0.0040 
PEG       
0  0.0061  0.0081  0.0107 
0.5  0.0047  0.0084  0.0131 
0.7  0.0029  0.0084  0.0151 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  0.0016  0.0021  0.0025 
0.5  6.1360×10⁻⁴  0.0017  0.0029 
0.7  2.7127×10⁻⁴  0.0014  0.0027 
PEG       
0  0.0061  0.0081  0.0107 
0.5  0.0023  0.0062  0.0114 
0.7  0.0010  0.0051  0.0110 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. 
Table 10: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Incomplete Market with Perfect Pass-
Through (η=4) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  6.0460×10⁻⁴  6.2767×10⁻⁴  6.7059×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  5.4332×10⁻⁴  7.2777×10⁻⁴  0.0010 
0.7  2.9093×10⁻⁴  6.7055×10⁻⁴  0.0012 
PEG       
0  0.0023  0.0025  0.0031 
0.5  0.0021  0.0028  0.0043 
0.7  0.0016  0.0027  0.0050 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  6.0460×10⁻⁴  6.2767×10⁻⁴  6.7059×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  4.0632×10⁻⁴  5.5376×10⁻⁴  8.5857×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  2.7120×10⁻⁴  3.9728×10⁻⁴  7.7348×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0023  0.0025  0.0031 
0.5  0.0015  0.0020  0.0036 
0.7  0.0011  0.0016  0.0034 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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Table 11: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Incomplete Market with Perfect Pass-
Through (η=6) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  2.9433×10⁻⁴  3.0264×10⁻⁴  3.0943×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  2.5562×10⁻⁴  3.6622×10⁻⁴  5.0384×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  5.5915×10⁻⁵  3.0349×10⁻⁴  6.0712×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0012  0.0013  0.0015 
0.5  0.0011  0.0015  0.0023 
0.7  7.1354×10⁻⁴  0.0014  0.0027 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  2.9433×10⁻⁴  3.0264×10⁻⁴  3.0943×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  2.0539×10⁻⁴  2.7478×10⁻⁴  4.2087×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  2.2190×10⁻⁴  1.8842×10⁻⁴  3.6586×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0012  0.0013  0.0015 
0.5  8.4552×10⁻⁴  0.0011  0.0019 
0.7  6.0655×10⁻⁴  8.7722×10⁻⁴  0.0018 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. 
 
In this case, the effect of habit on the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules is 
relatively limited  irrespective of external or internal habit (Tables  9–11).  If the degree of 
external habit is high, then external habit would have the same impact on welfare in an 
incomplete market as in  a financial autarky. For example, if  , 6 = η   , 5 . 0 = ν  and  , 8 . 0 = b  
then the PEG rule and the CPI rule outperform the DPI rule for a country spread premium 
equal to 0.03,  i.e.,  . 03 . 0 = B η  The welfare gain from the PEG rule and the CPI rule relative 
to the DPI rule are approximately 0.0002% and 0.0003% of the steady state consumption, 
respectively. 
3.4  Price Stability versus Exchange Rate Stability in Imperfect 
Pass-Through 
The previous section demonstrated that, in the case of perfect exchange rate pass-through, 
the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules depends  on the degree of habit 
persistence and the Frisch labor supply elasticity, as well as asset market structure . The 
PEG rule outperforms the PPI rule in a small open economy with external habit and high 
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, irrespective of asset 
market structure. In this subsection, we examine the relative performance of simple 
monetary policy rules in the case of imperfect exchange rate pass-through. 
3.4.1  Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary policy Rules in a Financial Autarky 
In a financial autarky, where the wealth effects are completely linked to domestic production, 
the effect of an imperfect exchange rate pass-through (or the effect of the exchange rate 
misalignment) on welfare is marginal, as shown in Tables 12–14. The CPI rule performs best 
for a substantial degree of external habit, while the DPI rule performs better than the CPI ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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rule and PEG rule for a moderate degree of external habit, irrespective of the values of 
intratemporal elasticity of substitution for traded goods and habit.  
 
We now consider the the case of internal habit. In this case, the inefficiency in the exchange 
rate arising from exchange rate misalignment is not enough to reverse the welfare ranking of 
alternative monetary policy rules. The findings of De Paoli (2009a) that the DPI rule is better 
than the PEG at high values of intratemporal elasticity of substitution also hold in this 
instance. 
Table 12: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Financial Autarky with Imperfect 
Pass-Through (η=2) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  9.6938×10⁻⁴  0.0010  0.0011 
0.5  3.1490×10⁻⁴  4.1187×10⁻⁴  6.5240×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -2.8734×10⁻⁴  -2.3071×10⁻⁴  -8.7970×10⁻⁶ 
PEG       
0  0.0059  0.0067  0.0088 
0.5  0.0039  0.0047  0.0069 
0.7  0.0017  0.0024  0.0045 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  9.6938×10⁻⁴  0.0010  0.0011 
0.5  4.4197×10⁻⁴  5.1248×10⁻⁴  6.9679×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  2.0186×10⁻⁴  2.4705×10⁻⁴  3.8398×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0059  0.0067  0.0088 
0.5  0.0039  0.0046  00066 
0.7  0.0023  0.0028  0.0043 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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Table 13: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Financial Autarky with Imperfect 
Pass-Through (η=4) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  2.6211×10⁻⁴  2.5820×10⁻⁴  2.4852×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  5.8339×10⁻⁷  2.0030×10⁻⁵  7.2895×10⁻⁵ 
0.7  -2.2961×10⁻⁴  -2.3132×10⁻⁴  -2.0008×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0018  0.0019  0.0022 
0.5  7.6726×10⁻⁴  9.4577×10⁻⁴  0.0014 
0.7  -1.3770×10⁻⁴  -3.1736×10⁻⁵  3.6073×10⁻⁴ 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  2.6211×10⁻⁴  2.5820×10⁻⁴  2.4852×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  8.7737×10⁻⁵  1.0054×10⁻⁴  1.3392×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  3.5014×10⁻⁵  4.2755×10⁻⁵  6.6731×10⁻⁵ 
PEG       
0  0.0018  0.0019  0.0022 
0.5  8.7373×10⁻⁴  0.0010  0.0014 
0.7  4.3191×10⁻⁴  5.2075×10⁻⁴  7.9091×10⁻⁴ 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. 
Table 14: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Financial Autarky Market with 
Imperfect Pass-Through (η=6) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  1.2103×10⁻⁴  1.1577×10⁻⁴  1.0508×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -2.9760×10⁻⁵  -2.1660×10⁻⁵  3.1729×10⁻⁶ 
0.7  -1.6691×10⁻⁴  -1.7310×10⁻⁴  -1.6574×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  8.8933×10⁻⁴  9.2982×10⁻⁴  0.0010 
0.5  2.6340×10⁻⁴  3.4010×10⁻⁵  5.3861×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -2.7114×10⁻⁴  -2.4375×10⁻⁴  -9.8776×10⁻⁵ 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  1.2103×10⁻⁴  1.1577×10⁻⁴  1.0508×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  3.4725×10⁻⁵  3.9744×10⁻⁵  5.2868×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  1.2103×10⁻⁴  1.5703×10⁻⁵  2.4854×10⁻⁵ 
PEG       
0  8.8933×10⁻⁴  9.2982×10⁻⁴  0.0010 
0.5  3.7331×10⁻⁴  4.3153×10⁻⁴  5.8706×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  1.7308×10⁻⁴  2.0859×10⁻⁴  3.1669×10⁻⁴ 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  




3.4.2  Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary policy Rules in Complete Markets 
Exchange rate misalignment plays a pivotal role in a  small open economy with a  complete 
market, irrespective of habit formation. Moreover, an imperfect exchange rate pass-through 
dominates  all the other elements we have previously considered (i.e.,  habit  persistence, 
intratemporal elasticity of substitution, and the Frisch labor supply elasticity), making the PEG 
rule the best among the considered simple rules. This reflects the fact that the real exchange rate 
gap arising from the exchange rate misalignment affects welfare more critically than the output 
gap arising from the habit.  
Figures 1 and 2 show that the coefficient of the real exchange rate in the welfare equation is 
always negative, irrespective of the degree of habit and intratemporal elasticity of substitution. In 
this circumstance, monetary policy which causes the the real exchange rate to appreciate is 
more likely to be welfare-improving.  With  imperfect exchange rate pass-through,  both 
domestically producing and importing firms  reoptimize their prices infrequently. Hence, the 
composite general price also moves sluggishly, making the real exchange rate highly dependent 
on the nominal exchange rate. As such, the PEG rule causes  the real exchange rate to 
appreciate more than any other simple monetary policy rule (Tables 15– 17). 
 
Table 15: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Complete Market with Imperfect Pass-
Through (η=2) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  -0.0014  -0.0012  -2.9529×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0046  -0.0038  -0.0014 
0.7  -0.0087  -0.0074  -0.0030 
PEG       
0  -0.0051  -0.0043   
0.5  -0.0159  -0.0136  -0.0019 
0.7  -0.0305  -0.0267  -0.0070 
Internal Habit      -0.0143 
CPI       
0  -0.0014  -0.0012  -2.9529×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0028  -0.0016  -5.1648×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -0.0032  -0.0019  -6.5473×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  -0.0051  -0.0043  -0.0019 
0.5  -0.0075  -0.0051  -0.0024 
0.7  -0.0084  -0.0058  -0.0029 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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Table 16: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Complete Market with Imperfect Pass-
Through (η=4) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  -0.0057  -0.0025  -7.8295×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0119  -0.0052  -0.0015 
0.7  -0.0203  -0.0088  -0.0024 
PEG       
0  -0.0146  -0.0076  -0.0029 
0.5  -0.0317  -0.0164  -0.0060 
0.7  -0.0553  -0.0285  -0.0103 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  -0.0057  -0.0025  -7.8295×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0063  -0.0028  -8.8286×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -0.0067  -0.0030  -9.5200×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  -0.0146  -0.0078  -0.0029 
0.5  -0.0158  -0..0082  -0.0032 
0.7  -0.0164  -0.0087  -0.0035 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. 
Table 17: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Complete Market with Imperfect Pass-
Through (η=6) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  -0.0066  -0.0026  -7.2727×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0130  -0.0048  -0.0012 
0.7  -0.0217  -0.0079  -0.0018 
PEG       
0  -0.0171  -0.0077  -0.0026 
0.5  -0.0348  -0.0152  -0.0047 
0.7  -0.0589  -0.0255  -0.0076 
Internal Habit       
CPI  -0.0066     
0  -0.0071  -0.0026  -7.2727×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  -0.0074  -0.0028  -7.8107×10⁻⁴ 
0.7    -0.0029  -8.2107×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  -0.0171  -0.0079  -0.0026 
0.5  -0.0179  -0.0081  -0.0028 
0.7  -0.0187  -0.0085  -0.0029 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  




3.4.3  Welfare Ranking of Alternative Monetary policy Rules in Incomplete Markets 
Finally, we consider the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules in incomplete 
markets. In an incomplete market with imperfect exchange rate pass-through, the effect of 
habit on the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules is as limited as in a financial 
autarky, irrespective of external or internal habit.  
We first consider the case of external habit. If the degree of external habit is high, then the 
impact of external habit on welfare is the  same in  incomplete markets as in financial 
autarkies. For example, consider the case of  , 6 = η   . 7 . 0 = b  The PEG rule and the CPI rule 
outperform the DPI rule for a country spread premium equal to 0.03, i.e.  . 03 . 0 = B η  The 
welfare gain from the PEG rule and the CPI rule relative to the DPI rule are approximately 
0.0003% and 0.0002% of the steady state consumption, respectively. This shows that the 
impact of external habit and the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy rules is similar 
to that in a financial autarky. 
In the case of internal habit, the welfare ranking of alternative simple monetary policy rules 
does not change at all in an incomplete market. The inefficiency in the exchange rate gap 
arising from exchange rate misalignment is not enough to reverse the welfare ranking of 
alternative monetary policy rules, as shown in Tables 18–20. 
 
Table 18: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Incomplete Market with Imperfect 
Pass-Through (η=2) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  0.0010  0.0011  0.0012 
0.5  0.0011  0.0013  0.0018 
0.7  8.0286×10⁻⁴  0.0014  0.0022 
PEG       
0  0.0049  0.0056  0.0073 
0.5  0.0048  0.0061  0.0094 
0.7  0.0042  0.0062  0.0110 
Internal Habit       
CPI    0.0011  0.0012 
0  0.0010  0.0013  0.0017 
0.5  0.0011  0.0013  0.0020 
0.7  0.0010     
PEG       
0  0.0049  0.0056  0.0073 
0.5  0.0049  0.0060  0.0092 
0.7  0.0046  0.0061  0.0104 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. 
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Table 19: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Incomplete Market with Imperfect 
Pass-Through (η=4) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  4.1340×10⁻⁴  3.9978×10⁻⁴  3.8555×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  4.1692×10⁻⁴  5.3101×10⁻⁴  6.6168×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  1.7967×10⁻⁴  4.7585×10⁻⁴  8.0843×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0021  0.0022  0.0026 
0.5  0.0020  0.0025  0.0038 
0.7  0.0014  0.0025  0.0046 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  4.1340×10⁻⁴  3.9978×10⁻⁴  3.8555×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  4.6875×10⁻⁴  5.3485×10⁻⁴  6.3932×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  4.1856×10⁻⁴  5.2934×10⁻⁴  7.2850×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0021  0.0022  0.0026 
0.5  0.0021  0.0026  0.0038 
0.7  0.0020  0.0027  0.0044 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. 
Table 20: Welfare Cost Relative to the DPI Rule: Incomplete Market with Imperfect 
Pass-Through (η=6) 
Degree of Habit  ν=1/2  ν=1  ν=3 
External Habit       
CPI       
0  2.1498×10⁻⁴  7.2081×10⁻⁵  1.8825×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  2.1482×10⁻⁴  2.0332×10⁻⁴  3.3476×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  -7.0319×10⁻⁶  2.8391×10⁻⁴  4.1707×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0012  2.7477×10⁻⁴  0.0014 
0.5  0.0011  0.0013  0.0022 
0.7  1.8789×10⁻⁴  0.0015  0.0026 
Internal Habit       
CPI       
0  2.1498×10⁻⁴  7.2081×10⁻⁵  1.8825×10⁻⁴ 
0.5  2.5376×10⁻⁴  2.8856×10⁻⁴  3.3118×10⁻⁴ 
0.7  2.1360×10⁻⁴  2.7592×10⁻⁴  3.7435×10⁻⁴ 
PEG       
0  0.0012  2.7477×10⁻⁴  0.0014 
0.5  0.0013  0.0016  0.0022 
0.7  0.0012  0.0016  0.0025 
CPI = consumer price index inflation targeting rule; PEG= exchange rate pegging rule  
Note: Entries are % units of steady state consumption. ADBI Working Paper 252    Jung 
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4.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we explored the welfare implications of simple monetary policy rules such as 
the DPI rule, the CPI rule, and the PEG rule  by  introducing  external and internal habit 
formation into a small open economy with nominal price rigidities under alternative asset 
market structures. We have shown that asset market structure is relevant for the welfare 
ranking of alternative monetary policy rules, even if both the intratemporal trade elasticity 
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption are unitary. 
The DPI rule can be inferior to the CPI rule in a sticky price model with a high degree of 
external habit in financial autarky, while the DPI rule is best among the considered simple 
rules in a complete asset market. This finding contrasts sharply to those of De Paoli (2009) 
and Faia and Monacelli (2008). More importantly, we have shown that the existence of 
external habit can reverse the welfare ranking of simple monetary policy rules in a complete 
market as well as in a financial autarky, for moderate values of intratemporal elasticity of 
substitution; with external habit, the PEG rule regime outperforms the DPI rule regime for 
high values of intratemporal elasticity  of substitution between domestic and imported 
products when households are catching up with the Joneses, irrespective of asset market 
structure. 
 Finally, we have shown that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply as well as the intratemporal 
elasticity between home goods and imported goods plays a pivotal role in determining the 
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